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ABSTRACT

Bad design and software defects often make source codes hard to understand and
lead to maintenance difficulties. In order to detect and fix such defects, researchers have
systematically investigated these issues and designed different effective algorithms to
tackle the problems. However, most of these methods need source codes/models for
defect detection and correction. Commercial companies, like banks, may not be willing to
provide their source models due to data security. Therefore, it is a huge challenge to
detect software detects by a consulting company as well as to keep source models
confidential. This thesis analyze security issues in existing approaches related to defect
detection and develop secure protocols to allow a software corporation and a consulting
company to exchange data securely without revealing any private information, which
make the approach practical in reality. The experimental results confirm the effectiveness
of the proposed approach.
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1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. PROBLEM BACKGROUND
In typical software life cycles, software maintenance mainly includes
adding/removing functionalities, detecting maintainability defects, correcting them, and
modifying the code to improve its quality. Although maintainability defects are
sometimes unavoidable, they should be removed from the code base as early as possible.
However, detecting and removing are difficult, time-consuming, and to some extent, a
manual process. To detect design defects automatically, several automated detection
techniques have been proposed [14] [13] [17] [23], which are proved effective to improve
software quality. In these settings, detection rules are manually defined or based on a
huge mount of quality metrics. However, for most small software companies, they do not
have enough resources to design complicated detection tools and collect rich rules or
quality metrics. Then it is worthy employing a consultant who has professional skills and
experience to diagnose source models and correct potential unreasonable defects.
Unfortunately, even though a plenty of research work has been done regarding
how to detect and remove software defects, few of them considered privacy issues in
their approaches. Certainly, it is in commercial companies’ best interests not to disclose
source codes, source models or any private information to others in the process of
software evaluation. Then it is a huge challenge for us to preserve privacy without
sharing source models, quality metrics, detection rules and algorithms between them. To
better understand the problem, this thesis will first review the typical process of software
defect detection and correction, and then discuss the privacy issues in the process.
Software maintainability defects, also called design anomalies, refer to design
situations that adversely affect the maintenance of software. Maintainability defects are
unlikely to cause failures directly, but may cause them indirectly. In general, they make a
system difficult to change, which may in turn introduce bugs. Software defect detection
refers to find software defects with a set of quality metrics, and correction is the process
to fix them with series of refactoring operations. For example, to correct the blob defect,
many operations can be used to reduce the number of functionalities in a specific class:
move methods, extract class, etc. Opdyke defines refactoring as the process of improving
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a code after it has been written by changing its internal structure without changing its
external behavior. The idea is to reorganize variables, classes and methods in order to
facilitate future extensions. This reorganization is used to improve different aspects of
software-quality: reusability, maintainability, complexity, etc.
The work [13] presents an effective approach to detect and correct software
defects, which is based on Genetic Algorithm (GA). This approach mainly includes two
steps. In the first step, it generates detection rules from an initial set of rules representing
random combinations of metrics. Then, Genetic Programming (GP) is applied to refine
this set progressively according to each individual rule’s ability to detect defects in the
example base. This process takes defect examples from source models as input, and its
objective is to prevent sharing source models’ information with consultants in this step.
After generating the detection rules, this approach uses them in the correction step. It
starts by generating some solutions that represent a combination of refactoring operations
and then evaluate them by their ability to correct defects. Eventually, the best solution
would correct most detected defects.
However, the approach [13] has some limitations, too. First, it has to access
source models to execute detection rules; second, it will take source models as input to
fix detected defects in correction step. All of these operations will disclose source models
to consulting corporations so that it may not be acceptable by most commercial
companies. In this thesis, new security protocols are proposed to overcome some of the
mentioned limitations and the new approach will allow a consulting company to evaluate
a commercial banks’ software without revealing any private information. At the
beginning, the concept of Trusted Third Party (TTP) [11] is introduced to model secure
defect detection and correction. Two parties can communicate safely with the TTP and do
not need to worry about security issues because TTP cannot disclose a party’s private
information to the other. Next, secure protocols are designed to replace the TTP such that
during the execution of the protocols, the private information is never disclosed.

1.2. PROBLEM DEFINITION
To better understand the thesis’ contribution, it is important to define the
problems of defect detection and correction, and the privacy preserving process. This
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section will first introduce the definitions of important concepts related to the new
proposed protocols, and then emphasize on the specific problems that are tackled by the
approach.
Defect Detection and Correction (DDC): The defect detection process consists of
finding code fragments that violate structure or semantic properties on code elements
such as coupling and complexity. The detected correction refers to fix these defects by
applying refactoring operations.
The functions Defect Detection and Defect Correction could be defined as below.

Defect_Detection(Ri , S) → Ri+1
•

(1)

Input: Ri represents the detection rules obtained in iteration i and

S denotes the source model
•

Output: Ri +1 represents the detection rules generated and evaluated in

iteration i + 1

The algorithm generates initial detection rules R0 from quality metrics and applies these
rules to detect defects in source models. Then it will evaluate each rule set based on its
ability to detect the number of defects. Next, it may generate new rule set R1 and evaluate
them again. Eventually, it outputs the best rule set r̂ , which can detect most defects in
source models, after n iterations.

Defect_Correction(rˆ, f j , S ) → f j +1

•

(2)

Input: r̂ denotes the best detection rules obtained from Defect Detection,

and fj represents refactoring operations generated in iteration j , S is the source
model.
•

Output: the refactoring set f j +1 generated and evaluated in iteration j + 1

Initially, the algorithm generates a set of refactoring operations f 0 and applies them to fix
detected defects in source models. Then it detects remaining defects with r̂ and evaluates
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the set of refactoring based on its ability to correct defects. Next, it will generate new
refactoring operations f1 and evaluate them too. At last, it will return the best refactoring
set fˆ which would fix most detected defects.
Secure Defect Detection and Correction (SDDC): preserve both parties’ private
information while following the general DDC process. Suppose P1 , e.g. a consulting
company, owns a set of quality metrics and refactoring; P2 , e.g. a commercial bank, has
private source models. SDDC allows P1 to apply quality metrics to detect software
defects in P2 ’s source models and fix them without revealing P1 ’s quality metrics,
detection and correction algorithms to P2 ; or disclosing P2 ’s source models to P1 . In
detection stage, SDDC will take source models, quality metrics as input, and output best
detection rules after iterations. Next, SDDC refines refactoring operations and evaluate
them with these rules; eventually generates optimal refactoring solutions as output, which
would correct most defects in source models.
Secure Defect Detection and Secure Defect Correction functions are defined as
the following.

Defect_Detection s ((P1 , Ri ), ( P2 , S )) → ( P1 , Ri +1 )
•

(3)

Input: (P1 , Ri ) represents P1 ’s private detection rules obtained in iteration

i and (P2 , S ) is the source model of P2

•

Output: the rule set Ri +1 which is generated and evaluated in iteration i + 1 ,

only P1 gets Ri +1

Equation (3) is similar to Equation (2), and it starts from generating initial detection rule
R0 . Eventually, it outputs the best rule set r̂ which can detect most defects.

Defect_Correction s ((P1 , rˆ, f j ), ( P2 , S )) → ( P1 , f j +1 )

(4)
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•

Input: (P1 , rˆ, f j ) includes two parts; r̂ is the best rule set obtained from (3)

which can detected most defects in source models, and f j is P1 ’s refactoring
generated in iteration j ; ( P2 , S ) denotes the source model of P2
•

Output: the refactoring set f j +1 which is generated and evaluated by P1 in

iteration j + 1

Similarly, Equation (4) starts from generating the initial set of refactoring operations f 0
to fix detected defects. In iteration j , it outputs f j +1 which will be the input of iteration
j + 1 . At last, P1 gets the best refactoring set fˆ which would fix most detected defects

and then P1 will send fˆ to P2 to fix the defects in source models.
Equation (3) and Equation (4) are very similar to Equation (1) and Equation (2)
except that they will preserve both parties’ private information in the process of defect
detection and correction. Both parties own some private items. For P1 , he has four private
items: first, the quality metrics; second, the best rule set; third, the process of the best rule
set generation; last, the process to generate the optimal refactoring set. Meanwhile, P2
only owns private source models. The thesis will propose a new approach to implement
algorithms defined by Equation (3) and Equation (4), and fulfill security property at the
same time. The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Section 2 is dedicated to
the related work and background. The TTP model is outlined in Section 3. In Section 4,
the thesis gives an overview of secure protocols. Then, Section 5 discusses security and
communication analysis and Section 6 presents the validation results. Future research
directions are summarized and suggested in Section 7.
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2. RELATED WORK

2.1. INTRODUCTION OF EXISTING APPROACHES
The techniques regarding detecting and fixing design defects range from fully
automatic detection and correction to guided manual inspection. Design defect detection
and correction can be classified into three broad categories: rules-based detectioncorrection, detection and correction combination, and visual-based detection.
In the first category, Marinescu [18] defined a list of rules relying on metrics to
detect defects which are at method, class and subsystem levels. Erni and Lewerentz [6]
introduce the concept of multi-metrics, n-tuples of metrics expressing a quality criterion
(e.g., modularity) to evaluate frameworks and improve them. Both of the two existing
solutions require users to manually define threshold values for metrics in the rules, which
is the main limitation of them. To handle this problem, Alikacem and Sahraoui express
defect detection as fuzzy rules, with fuzzy labels for metrics, e.g., small, medium, large,
and evaluate the rules by means of membership functions. Although no crisp thresholds
need to be defined, it is not obvious to determine the membership functions. Moha et al.
[19], in their DÉCOR approach, they start by describing defect symptoms using an
abstract rule language. These descriptions involve different notions, such as class roles
and structures. The descriptions are later mapped to detection algorithms. In addition to
the threshold problem, this approach uses heuristics to approximate some notions, which
results in a high rate of false positives. Khomh et al. [15] extended DECOR to support
uncertainty and to sort the defect candidates accordingly. The majority of existing
approaches to automate refactoring activities are based on rules that can be expressed as
assertions (invariants, pre- and post-conditions), or graph transformations. The use of
invariants has been proposed to detect parts of program that require refactoring by
Kataoka et al. [12]. Opdyke [22] suggested the use of pre- and post-condition with
invariants to preserve the behavior of the software. All these conditions could be
expressed in the form of rules. Heckel [10] considers refactorings activities as graph
production rules (programs expressed as graphs). However, a full specification of
refactorings would require a large number of rules. In addition, refactoring-rules sets
have to be complete, consistent, non redundant, and correct. Furthermore, the algorithm
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needs to find the best sequence of applying these refactoring rules. In such situations,
search-based techniques represent a good alternative.
In the second category of work, these approaches refactor a system by detecting
elements to change to improve the global quality. For example, in [21], defect detection
is considered as an optimization problem. The authors use a combination of 12 metrics to
measure the improvements achieved when sequences of simple refactorings are applied,
such as moving methods between classes. The goal of the optimization is to determine
the sequence that maximizes a function, which captures the variations of a set of metrics
[9].The fact that the quality in terms of metrics is improved does not necessary means
that the changes make sense. The link between defect and correction is not obvious,
which make the inspection difficult for the maintainers.
The high rate of false positives generated by the automatic approaches
encouraged other researchers to explore semiautomatic solutions. These solutions took
the form of visualization-based environments. The primary goal is to take advantage of
the human ability to integrate complex contextual information in the detection process.
Kothari et al. [16] presented a pattern-based framework for developing tool support to
detect software anomalies by representing potential defects with different colors. Later,
Dhambri et al. [5] proposed a visualization-based approach to detect design anomalies by
automatically detecting some symptoms. The visualization metaphor was chosen
specifically to reduce the complexity of dealing with a large amount of data. Still, the
visualization approach is not obvious when evaluating large-scale systems. Moreover, the
visualized information is metric-based and is difficult to detect complex relationships. In
Kessentini’s approach [13], human intervention is needed only to provide defect
examples. Finally, the use of visualization techniques is limited to the detection step.
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2.2. KESSENTINI’S APPROACH
Kessentini investigated limitations of the existing approaches and proposed a
search-based refactoring scheme, which is the most effective one now. In this section,
first let’s review the detection and correction phases of this algorithm, and then analyze
its security issues in practice. Figure 2.1 shows the general structure of the approach. It
includes two important steps: 1) defects detection and 2) correction. The detection step
takes a base example (i.e., a set of defects examples) and a set of quality metrics as inputs,
and generates a set of rules as output. The generation process can generate the best set of
rules that detect the maximum number of defects.
The correction step takes the generated detection rules and a set of refactoring
operations as inputs, and generates a sequence of refactoring as output. The process can
generate the best set of refactoring that minimizes the number of detected defects using
the detection rules.
Refactoring operations

defect examples
quality metrics

Generation of
detection rules

detection rules

Code correction

best refactoring solutions

Code to be corrected

Figure 2.1. Overview of the approach
2.2.1. Defect Detection. The detection process starts from an initial set of rules
representing random combinations of metrics. In order to understand the process, readers
have to learn how to generate initial rules first. In fact, quality metrics (logic program) is
represented as a forest of ANDOR trees. For example, consider the following logic
program:

C1: defect (blob) :- locClass (upper, 1500), locMethod (upper,129).
C2: defect (blob) :- nmd (upper, 100).
C3: defect (spaghettiCode) :- locMethod (upper,151).
C4: defect (functionalDecomposition) :- nPrivField (upper,7), nmd (equal,16).
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These logic programs can serve to build the defect detection rules. The set of rules C1-C4
can be described as the following:
R1 : IF (LOCCLASS ≥ 1500 ∧ LOCMETHOD ≥ 129) ∨ (NMD ≥ 100) THEN
defect = blob
R2 : IF (LOCMETHOD ≥ 151) THEN defect = spaghetti code
R3 : IF (NPRIVFIELD ≥ 7 ∧ NMD = 16) THEN defect = functional
decomposition

Thus, the first rule is represented as a sub-tree of nodes (AND-OR, metrics) as shown in
Figure 2.2. The main program tree will be a composition of three sub-trees: R1 AND R2
AND R3. This example contains several special terms whose meanings are listed as
below and shown in Table 2.1.

Blob: It is found in designs where one large class monopolizes the behavior of a
system (or part of it), and other classes primarily encapsulate data.
Spaghetti Code: It is a code with a complex and tangled control structure.
Functional Decomposition: It occurs when a class is designed with the intent of
performing a single function. This is found in code produced by non-experienced
object-oriented developers.

OR
AND

LOCCLASS
>= 1500

NMD >= 100

LOCMETHOD
>= 129

Figure 2.2. A tree representation of an individual rule
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Table 2.1. List of related notation
Notation

Description

LOCCLASS

the number of lines of code in each class

LOCMETHOD

the number of lines of code in each method

NMD

the number of methods

NPRIVFIELD

the number of private fields

After initial rule set generation, this set is refined progressively according to its
ability to detect defects present in the example base. Due to the very large number of
possible rules (metric combinations), it uses a rule induction heuristic, called Genetic
Programming (GP) to find a near-optimal set of detection rules. This approach’s defect
detection algorithm is given in Algorithm 1.
In fact, Equation (1) describes only an iteration of GP, but Algorithm 1 shows the
whole process. It takes initial rule set and source models containing defect examples as
input. Lines 2 construct an initial GP population, based on a given rule set R0 . The
population stands for a set of possible solutions representing detection rules (metrics
combination). Lines 4-20 encode the main GP loop, which searches for the best metrics
combination. During each iteration, it evaluates the quality of each solution (individual)
in the population, and the solution having the best fitness is saved. It generates a new
population of solutions using the crossover operator (line 18) to the selected solutions;
each pair of parent solutions produces two children (new solutions). It includes the parent
and child variants in the population and then applies the mutation operator to each variant;
this produces the population for the next generation. The algorithm terminates when it
achieves the termination criteria (maximum iteration number), and return the best set of
detection rules (solution).

Algorithm 1 Defect_Detection(R0,S)
Require: R0:initial rule set, S: source models with defects examples.
1: i=0
2: initial_population=R0
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3: fitness_ r̂ =0
4: while i ≤ m do
5:

fitness_ r̂ i=0

6:

for all rj in Ri do

7:

detected_defects_rj=Execute_Rules(rj,S)

8:

fitness_rj=Compare(detected_defects_rj,S)

9:

if fitness_ r̂ i＜fitness_rj then

10:

fitness_ r̂ i=fitness_rj

11:

r̂ i=rj

12:

end if

13:

end for

14:

if fitness_ r̂ ＜fitness_ r̂ i then

15:

fitness_ r̂ = fitness _ rˆ i

16:

r̂ = r̂ i

17:

end if

18:

Ri+1=Generate_New_Population(Ri)

19:

i=i+1

20: end while
21: return r̂

GP is introduced here to generate new rules. It generates new offsprings using
selection, crossover or mutation in each iteration. New generated rules will be executed
in next iteration and it will be saved as the new best solution if its fitness value is greater
than current saved rules.
•

Selection

For the initial prototype, it uses stochastic universal samplying (SUS)
selection algorithm, in which each individual’s probability of selection is
directly proportional to its relative fitness in the population.
•

Mutation
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It starts by randomly selected a node in the tree. Then, if the selected node is a
terminal (quality metric), it is replaced by another terminal (metric or another
threshold value); if it is a function (and-or), it is replaced by a new function; and
if tree mutation is to be carried out, the node and its sub-tree are replaced by a
new randomly generated sub-tree. Figure 2.3 shows an example of the mutation
operation.
•

Crossover

Two parent individuals are selected and a sub-tree is picked on each one. Then
crossover swaps the nodes and their relative sub-trees from one parent to the other.
Figure 2.4 shows an example of the crossover process. The rule R1 and a rule R2
form another individual (solution) are combined to generate new two rules.
OR

Before mutation
AND

LOCCLASS
>= 1500

NMD >= 100

LOCMETHOD
>= 129

OR

After mutation
AND

LOCCLASS
>= 1500

NMD >= 100

LOCMETHOD
>= 129

Figure 2.3. Mutation operator

13
OR
AND

NMD >= 100
AND

LOCCLASS
>= 1500

LOCMETHOD
>= 129
NMD= 16

NPRIVFIELD
>= 7

OR
AND

AND
NPRIVFIELD
>= 7
NMD>=100

LOCCLASS
>= 1500

NMD= 16

LOCMETHOD
>= 129

Figure 2.4. Crossover operator

2.2.2. Defect Correction After generating the detection rules, it uses them in the
correction step. As shown in Algorithm 2, it starts by generating the initial solution f0
that represents a combination of refactoring operations to apply. The defect correction
algorithm takes the best detection rule set

rˆ

, initial refactoring set f0 and source models

as input. Then it executes the refactoring sequence on source models. Next, a fitness
function calculates, after applying the proposed refactoring, the number of remaining
defects using the detection rules. At last, the best solution ^ f which has the minimum
fitness value is returned. Due to the large number of refactoring combination, a Genetic
Algorithm (GA) is used.

Algorithm 2 Defect_Correction( r̂ ,f0,S)
Require: r̂ :the best rule set, f0:initial refactoring operations, S: source models.
1: initial_population=f0
2: i=0
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3: fitness_ fˆ =MAX_INTEGER
4: while i ≤ n do
5:

Excute_Refactorings(fi, S)

6:

detected_defects=Execute_Rules( r̂ ,S)

7:

fitness_fi=｜detected_defects︱

8:

if fitness_ fˆ ＞ fitness_fi then

9:

fitness_ fˆ =fitness_fi

10:

fˆ = fi

11:

end if

12:

fi+1 = Generate_New_Population(fi)

13:

i=i+1

14: end while
15: return fˆ

The approach views the set of potential solutions as points in an n-dimensional
space, where each dimension corresponds to one refactoring operation, or called logic
predicate. Initially, it generates a sequence of refactoring and executes them on the
detected defects. Then, Genetic Algorithm is applied. The crossover operator creates two
offspring from the two selected parents and the mutation operator will randomly change a
dimension (refactoring) with a new refactoring. After applying crossover and mutation
operators, the algorithm will generate a set of new refactoring. Then the new refactoring
operations will be executed on source codes again.
Every set of generated refactoring can be viewed as a new correction solution and
a defined fitness function quantifies the quality of the proposed refactoring. In fact, the
fitness function checks to minimize the number of detected defects using the detection
rules. At last, the algorithm will generate the best correction solutions, which are
combinations of refactoring operations, and should minimize, as much as possible, the
number of defects detected using the detection rules.
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3. SECURITY ISSUES AND A NAIVE SOLUTION BASED ON TTP

3.1. SECURITY ISSUES IN KESSENTINI’S APPROACH
In this subsection, the thesis will analyze security issues in Kessentini’s scheme
and then propose a naive solution based on TTP. As said in Section 1.1, in the whole
process, P1 has four private items and P2 owns private source models. In fact, these
private items could be classified as two different types of privacy: data privacy and
algorithm privacy.
•

Data Privacy

Certainly, quality metrics and the detection rules which are combinations of these
metrics are valuable for P1 . Meanwhile, for P2 , source models are its private data.
Therefore, both parties’ data privacies in the whole process have to be preserved
and each party’s private data should not be disclosed to the other. In order to
preserve data privacy, such secure protocols are desired, which implement all
features of Equation (1) and (2), and also have security property at the same time.
In fact, most interaction and data exchange happen in the two functions Execute
Rules and Compare in detection and correction algorithms, so the main goal of
this thesis is to design secure versions of the two functions.
•

Algorithm Privacy

Besides private data, the processes of finding best detection rule set and best
refactoring operations are private, too. P1 will not allow P2 to learn them or apply
these algorithms to evaluate its software by itself later. Therefore, the secure
protocols should fulfill data privacy and preserve algorithm privacy, too.

3.2. INTRODUCTION OF TTP
The goal is to implement Equations (3) and (4) with security property and the
thesis will take two steps to achieve such target. First, it redesigns Equations (1)/(2) to
fulfill the requirements Equations (3)/(4) by adding a trusted third party in the process.
Then, it designs new secure protocols that can act as the same roles as TTPs. A trusted
third party (TTP) can be described as an entity trusted by other entities with respect to
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security-related services and activities. TTP is an impartial intermediary whose role is to
ensure that each party receives the item it expects. It is assumed that the TTP is neutral,
available and trusted by all groups. Sometimes, more than one TTP might be involved in
a transaction. Typically, a TTP will be an organization licensed or accredited by a
regulatory authority, which will provide security services, on a commercial basis, to a
wide range of bodies, including those within the telecommunications, finance and retail
sectors.
The use of TTPs is dependent on the fundamental requirement that the TTP is
trusted by the entities it serves to perform certain functions. In practice, TTPs could exist
in both public and corporate domains, at the local, national and international level. TTPs
should have trust agreements arranged with other TTPs to form a network, thus allowing
a user to communicate securely with every user of every TTP with whom his TTP has an
agreement. Any TTP scheme should also allow for both national and international
operation, allowing users in any country, where an appropriate TTP resides, to
communicate securely. TTPs can be categorized according to their communication
relationships with the users they serve [5], [6]. A TTP may provide its services through a
combination of the different modes for different parts of its service.
•

Off-line TTPs

An off-line TTP does not interact with the user entities during the process of the
given security service unless a problem occurs. Fox example, the two parties
directly trade their items, and in case of any problem, the TTP will be involved to
mediate between the parties.
•

On-line TTPs

An on-line TTP is requested by one or both entities in real-time to provide, or
register, security-related information. Such a TTP is not in the communications
path between the two entities; rather, it is for verifying an item, and generating
and/or storing proof of exchange of items.
•

In-line TTPs

An in-line TTP is positioned in the communication path between the entities.
Such an arrangement allows the TTP to offer a wide range of security services
directly to users. This means that the TTP receives the items from each party,
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authenticates them and delivers them to the respective parties. Since the TTP
interrupts the communication path, different security domains can exist on either
side of it.

3.3. A NAIVE SOLUTION BASED ON TTP
Because P1 and P2 cannot share and exchange their private items directly, it is
reasonable to design an in-line TTP model in this scenario in order to preserve data and
algorithm privacies.
In detection stage, data privacy includes P1 ’s quality metrics and detection rules;
P2 ’s source models. To preserve data privacy in this step, P1 and P2 should send
detection rules and source models to an in-line TTP, respectively. Then, TTP will execute
these rules on source models and compute the rule set’s fitness score. After that he sends
the fitness back to P1 who then updates its best rule set if the received fitness score is
greater than current one. In addition, to preserve algorithm privacy, P2 should not learn
the GP iteration process, so it is better to request P1 to apply GP to generate new rules
and sends them to TTP for execution, and TTP returns calculated fitness score to P1 for
evaluation. The iteration process continues and finally, P1 will find the best detection
rules. In this model only TTP knows both parties’ private data and algorithms; P1 and P2
will learn nothing regarding the other’s private information. Figure 3.1 shows the process
and the role of TTP in detection.

TTP
source 1
models

3,7...n-1
2,6...n-2

fitness

detection
rules
Bank

Consultant
5,9...n-3
generate new
detection rules

4,8...n
update best
detection rule set

Figure 3.1. TTP model in defect detection

18
In correction step, because P1 should call the routine Execute Rules and Compare
to detect remaining defects in each correction iteration, data privacy is the same as that of
detection phase. Only difference is algorithm privacy, and so the secure protocols have to
keep the original process to generate refactoring solutions private. Therefore, the
responsibilities of TTP role in this step are to preserve the same data privacy as that of
detection and keep the refactoring generating process safe. In each iteration, P1 sends
refactoring operations to TTP who will execute them on source models. Next, TTP
applies detection rule set to detect remaining defects and inform P1 the refactorings’
fitness. P1 saves the refactoring set as current best solution if it has a smaller fitness score.
Then P1 will generate new refactorings and require TTP to evaluate them. At last, P1
obtains the best solutions and then send them to P2 to fix most detected defects. Figure
3.2 shows the correction step and its output.

TTP
source 1
models

refactoring
3,7...n-3 operations
2

4,8...n-2

2 best detection
rules

fitness

Bank

n

Consultant

best refactoring set

5,9...n-1
update best
refactoring set


generate new
refactorings

Figure 3.2. TTP model in defect correction

3.4. COMPARISON TO IDEAL TTP MODELS
The proposed TTP models are designed to follow the process of Genetic
Algorithm, so P1 has to interact with the TTP role for many rounds. However, they are
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not ideal TTP models because the communication rounds between a TTP role and P1
would leak the fitness score of a rule set to P1 . In an ideal model, P1 and P2 send quality
metrics and Genetic Algorithm; source models to a TTP, respectively. Next, the TTP runs
A to find best detection rules and optimal refactoring solutions. Finally he applies the
solutions to fix existing defects in source model and then returns it to P2 . In the process,
the TTP do not interact with P1 , so no extra information is disclosed.
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4. PRIVACY-PERSERVING DDC PROTOCOLS

4.1. THE ROLE OF SECURE PROTOCOLS
TTP is an ideal model, but in reality it is hard to find a fully trusted third party.
Even through, TTP model is definitely the guide for secure protocol design. If a new
protocol is proved to be able to replace entire TTP role in the model, then the protocol is
secure and implements all functions of TTP role.
The data and algorithm privacies of Kessentini’s approach are analyzed in Section
3.1. Algorithm privacy is not hard to preserve because it is straightforward to require P1
to execute most steps in the process and he only interacts with P2 when he has to do that.
However, to preserve data privacy is not easy because the approach executes generated
rules on source models to obtain the best rule set. How to keep the entire private data
secret during the execution? In fact, as mentioned in Section 3.1, to preserve privacy, it is
indispensable to design secure version for function Execute Rules and Compare. In TTP
model, all private data is sent to TTP and the two routines are executed by TTP too. Now,
it is very possible to design secure protocols to replace the TTP role.
First, let us analyze the routine Execute Rules. In every iteration of detection
phase, each new generated rule is a combination of quality metrics. In order to apply
these rules, the function Execute Rules will compare each rule’s thresholds with source
models’ information, e.g. LOCCLASS, NMD, to determine if software defects exist in a
class, which means P1 only concerns whether these statistical indicators of each class are
greater or less than thresholds of its detection rules instead of their actual values. Based
on such investigation, secure comparison techniques and secure multi-party computation
(SMC) can be applied to perform such comparison. P1 will execute his rules and evaluate
P2 ’s software quality according to secure comparison results without learning any private
information of source models. Also, P2 cannot learn P1 ’s quality metrics, detection rules
from the secure comparison protocol.
Now, a plenty of research work has been done regarding secure comparison.
General two-party computation was introduced by Yao [29], and general computation for
multiple parties was introduced in [3]. Most of the existing secure protocols focus on
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solutions of secure integer comparison problem and their applications, e.g. online auction,
data mining without learning more details [2], association rule mining [24], web services
[1], etc. Secure integer comparison (SC) is the starting point of SMC protocols. There are
a plenty of specialized solutions to the problem which provides efficiency with respect to
generic methods [7] . Most of these solutions are based on doing calculations on the bits
of integers by using homomorphic encryption or encrypting bits as quadratic residues and
non-residues modulo an RSA modulus. The work [20] shows that it is more efficient than
previous ones. Therefore, the thesis integrate [20] to the designs and apply it to handle
secure issues in rule execution.
Second, the thesis discusses how to apply secure protocols to preserve privacy in
the function Compare. Actually, the routine Compare is to compute fitness score for each
rule set and in a word it is to calculate what percent of true defects are found by the
detection rules. The secure protocols should compute the fitness without disclosing P2 ’s
true defects to P1 . To compute the fitness score, it is the key point to get the number of
detected true defects. In fact, it is not hard to imagine that base examples contain true
defect set defined manually by experienced engineers and detected defects are included
by another set, then the problem to find the number of detected true defects can be
transformed to compute the intersection of two sets. Dot product for set intersection
computation is another category of secure protocols and it is a perfect solution to tackle
the security issues in the routine Compare. In the following section, the thesis will discuss
the details of how to apply this technique to design secure version of the Compare
function.

4.2. SECURE INTEGER COMPARISON
Secure multi-party computation (SMC) was first suggested by Yao[1] as the
millionaires problem, in which two millionaires want to learn who is richer without
revealing their wealth to each other. The problem with its solution gave rise to the more
general problem, where multiple parties try to compute some function securely given
each party contributes some secret input. Several secure integer comparison (SC)
protocols [8] [3] [7] have been widely studied and proposed. Recently, the work [20]
proposed a new secure comparison protocol that can be applied to check some integer
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over an interval securely. It uses a perfect binary tree (PBT), in which the leaf level
contains all possible integers, 0 through n1, and this protocol is designed to compare two
integers at leaf level. Properly speaking, the secure integer comparison scheme with
arguments (a, b) is a two-party protocol between P1 and P2 who have n bit inputs a and b
respectively. At the end of the protocol, P1 learns if b _ a without learning b.
This scenario is exactly the same as the situation in threshold evaluation, and then
it is possible to apply SC to get the comparison results. To understand this scheme, first,
the concept of PBT and some definitions will be covered. In a word, a PBT is a full
binary tree and all non-leaf nodes exactly have two children. Here a unique label (h, o) is
used to represent a node in PBT, where h denotes the node’s height and o denotes its
order in the layer.
Before readers start to understand this algorithm, some special terms should be
learnt first.
Coverage: Given a PBT, it is said that a tree node (h1, o1) covers a leaf node (0,
o2) if there exists a path from (h1, o1) to (0, o2) in the tree. The covering set of a
given leaf node v is the set of all nodes in the PBT that cover v. The coverage of a
tree node v is the set of all leaf nodes covered by v. For example, in Figure 4.1,
(2, 1) covers (0, 6). Covering set of the leaf node (0, 6) is {(0, 6), (1, 3), (2, 1),
(3, 0)}. The coverage of (2, 1) is {(0, 4), (0,5), (0, 6), (0, 7)}.
Representer Set: is a minimal set that is the coverage of all leaves in a set of leaf
nodes. In Figure 4.1, {(1, 1)} is a minimal representer for {(0, 2), (0, 3)}, and {(0,
4)} is a minimal representer for {(0, 4)}. Then {(1, 1), (0, 4)} is a minimal
representer for {(0, 2), (0, 3), (0, 4)}.
Homomorphic Encryption [4]: is a form of encryption which allows specific
types of computations to be carried out on ciphertext and obtain an encrypted
result. For some prime p, it has the following properties.

E (m0 ) ⋅ E (m1 ) = E (m0 + m1 )
E ( m) c = E (c ⋅ m )
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In the algorithm Secure Comparison [20], P1 wants to compare its private integer
a to P2 ’s private b. First, P1 creates a representer set for the leaf nodes (0, 0) … (0, a).
For each level i in the PBT, P1 creates a polynomial Ti whose root is the order of the
representer node with height i. P1 uses an additively homomorphic public key encryption
scheme, E, to encrypt the coefficients and sends the encrypted polynomials to P2 who
calculates the covering set B of the node (0, b). For each node v in B, he securely
evaluates polynomial Pv⋅h on v ⋅ o with help of the homomorphic property of the
encryption. He multiplies the results with positive random numbers, and sends the
shuffled results back to P1 who will learn b ≤ a if any of the results decrypts to 0.
As an example of the algorithm, suppose P1 holds a = 5, P2 holds b = 2. Then, P1
creates the representer {(1, 2), (2, 0)} for the set of leaf nodes {(0, 0)…(0, 5)} which
represents a. Next, P1 generates cofficient set {-1, -2, 0}. He sends encrypted coefficients
Epk(1), Epk(-2), Epk(0) to P2 in order. P2 finds the covering of (0,2); {(0,2),(1,1),(2,0)} and
calculates (Epk (2) * Epk (1))r * Epk (0), (Epk (1) * Epk (-2))r * Epk (0), (Epk (0) * Epk (0))r *
Epk (0) and sends back to P1 in random order. P1 sees one of the outputs decrypts to 0,
she concludes b ≤ a . It is not hard to explain the theory of secure integer comparison in a
simple sentence. Because P1 ’s representer covers all leaf nodes less or equal to a, then
b’s coverage must include one of nodes in the representer if b ≤ a .
In detection step, the secure protocols may apply the protocol as below. P1 creates
the representer for a threshold and compute coefficient set. Then he sends encrypted
coefficients to P2 in order. P2 finds the coverage of its corresponding statistical indicator
and calculates the product of encrypted coverage and coefficients. Finally he sends them
back to P1 randomly and P1 will learn which one is greater based on the decryption
output.
The security of detection algorithm is based on the inability of either side to learn
the other side’s item without private key. In this protocol, the only way to decrypt P1 ’s
encrypted representer is to learn the private key, unfortunately P2 cannot learn the key
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because it belongs to P1 . P2 knows the public key and then he can encrypt its data with a
random r. Similarly, P1 received EPR[i] = (EP[i] * E(B[i].o))r * Epk(0) = E[r *(P[i] +
B[i].o)], then he cannot learn P2 ’s original data for he doesn’t know the random number r
and data’s exact order. He only learns whether the sum of two integers is zero or not
based on the property of homomorphic encryption.

4.3. THRESHOLD EVALUATION ALGORITHM
Once a secure comparison solution is found, it is not hard to integrate it to the
threshold evaluation algorithm which executes each rule securely by calling the secure
comparison routine. As shown in Algorithm 3, an individual rule can be divided into
threshold set and operator set. First, it calls Secure Comparison to compare each pair of
integers; threshold and corresponding information of source models. Then, apply
operators to the comparison set to get variable b which is either 1 if the class contains a
defect or 0, otherwise.

Algorithm 3 Threshold_Evaluations((P1, T, O), (P2, S))
Require: P1: T(Threshold set) = {t1, t2,. . . ,tm}, O(Operation set) ={o1, o2,. . . ,om-1},
P2: S(Statistics information of source models) = { s1, s2,…, sm}
1: C(Comparison set) = { c1, c2,…, cm}, where ci = Secure_Comparison(si, ti)
2: b = c1 o1 c2 o2 … om-1 cm
3: return b

Take rule R1 as an example, for rule R1, T={1500, 129, 100}, O={∧, ∨}, S=
{LOCCLASS, LOCMETHOD, NMD}. Then C={LOCCLASS ≥ 1500, LOCMETHOD
≥ 129, NMD ≥ 100} and R={c1 ∧ c2 ∨ c3}. Thus, if b is 1, then the detected class is a
blob, otherwise if b is 0, no blob defect in this class.

4.4. USING SECURE SET INTERSECTION TO COMPUTE FITNESS
As data privacy mentioned in Section 3, the main objective is to implement secure
protocols for Execute Rules and Compare functions. Now a secure comparison algorithm
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is proposed, which can replace Execute Rules and allow two parties to evaluate each
individual rule securely. In this subsection, the thesis will discuss how to apply secure set
intersection techniques to compute fitness and replace the function Compare.
First, let’s learn how to compute an individual rule set’s fitness score. The fitness
function checks to maximize the number of detected defects in comparison to the
expectedones in the base of examples. Kessentini’s approach [13] defined the fitness
function as
p

p

∑ ai
i =1

f =

t

∑a

i

+

i =1

p

2

In the function, f is normalized in the range [0, 1]; p is the number of detected
classes and t is the number of defects in the base of example; ai has value 1 if the ith
detected classes exists in the base example (with the same defect type), and value 0
otherwise. From the function, it is clear that the summation of ai is actually the size of
intersection between detected defects and defects in the example base. In fact, P2 may not
be willing to disclose true defects in the base example to P1 because P1 might create fake
rules conformed to these true defects to show false effectiveness of his solution,
otherwise. Thus, it is better to keep the true defects private while computing fitness. A
secure Compare function is already proposed, by which P2 can obtain the size of
intersection of two defect set and thus learn the effectiveness of this rule set. Once P2
gets the size of intersection set, it is straightforward to calculate the fitness by applying
the proposed fitness function.

Algorithm 4 Compares((P1, D), (P2, E))
Require: P1: DS(Detected defect set) = ﹛ d1, d2,. . . ,dm﹜ ; P2: ES(Defect examples in
source models) =﹛ e1,e2,…, em﹜ ; E and D are additively homomorphic semantically
secure encryption/decryption functions, respectively; pk is the public key.
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1: P2: EE(Encrypted defect examples) =﹛ ee1,ee2,…,eem﹜ , where eei = Epk(ei)
2: P2: send EE to P1
3: P1: P(Product set) = { p1, p2, …, pm}, where pi = di ×eei
4: e = 1
5: for all pi ∈ P do
6:
7:
8:

if pi ≠ 0 then
P1 : e = e × p i
end if

9: end for
10: P1: sends e to P2
11: P2: d = D(e)
12: P2: learns the effectiveness of this rule set
13: P2: computes the fitness and return it to P1

In Algorithm 4, all elements in the input sets DS and ES are binary numbers,
whose values are either 1 or 0. First P2 uses homomorphic encryption algorithm to
encrypt true defects and then sends the sequence to P1 in order, who will compute each
pi . Afterward the product of all non-zero pi is calculated and its decryption result shows
the size of DS and ES’s intersection. Next, P2 computes the fitness score of this rule set
and return it to P1 , who will update his optimal rule set based on this score.

4.5. SECURE PROTOCOL FOR DEFECT DETECTION
As mentioned in section 2, one of the research goals is to implement
Defect_Detections. Now it is already described that how to apply SC to preserve privacy
in routine Execute Rules; how to compute fitness securely by set intersection algorithm.
Thereby, it is not hard to design secure protocols for detect detection. As the protocol
shown in Algorithm 5, the thesis divide the original process into two sequences of actions
performed by P1 and P2 , respectively. They call Threshold Evaluations and Compares to
preserve data privacy, and P1 controls the process of GP to achieve algorithm privacy.
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Algorithm 5 Defect_Detections((P1, R0), (P2, S, E))
Require: (P1, R0): P1’s initial rules, (P2, S, E): P2’s source models and defect examples.
1: P1: i = 0
2: P1: initial_population = R0
3: P1: fitness_ r̂ = 0
4: while i ≤ m do
5:

P1: fitness_ r̂ i = 0

6:

for all rj in Ri do

7:

P1: detected_defects_rj = 0

8:

for all classk in S do

9:

P1, P2: (P1, b) = Threshold_Evaluations((P1, T_ rj , O_ rj ), (P2, classk))

10:

if b = 1 then

11:
12:

P1: detected_defects_rj = detected_defects_rj + 1
end if

13:

end for

14:

P1: fitness_rj = Compares((P1, detected_defects_rj), (P2, E))

15:

if fitness_

rˆ i

< fitness_rj then

16:

P1: fitness_

17:

P1: r̂ i = rj

18:

rˆ i

= fitness_rj

end if

19:

end for

20:

if fitness_ r̂ < fitness_ r̂ i then

21:

P1: fitness_ r̂ = fitness_ r̂ i

22:

P1: r̂ = r̂ i

23:

end if

24:

P1: Ri+1 = Generate_New_Population(Ri)

25:

P1 : i = i + 1

26: end while
27: return r̂
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4.6. SECURE PROTOCOL FOR DEFECT CORRECTION
Once P1 finds the best detection rules, he will choose proper refactoring to fix all
detected defects. For correction, they also need to exchange information to correct
existing defects and evaluate the effectiveness of refactoring operations. In the process,
P1 chooses a refactoring set for the current defects and sends them to P2 for execution.
P2 will run the refactoring operators on source models and then they will exchange
information to compute the fitness for this refactoring sequence. Next, P1 may apply
Genetic Algorithm to generate new offsprings or new refactorings and follow the same
procedure as previous to evaluate them. The iteration continues and finally, the process
outputs the best refactoring set which can fix most defects. Algorithm 6 shows the secure
correction process.

Algorithm 6 Defect_Corrections((P1, r̂ , f0), (P2, S))
Require: (P1, r̂ , f0): r̂ is the best rule set, f0 is initial refactoring operations; (P2, S): S is
the source model.
1: P1: initial_population = f0
2: P1: i = 0
3: P1: fitness_ fˆ = MAX_INTEGER
4: while i ≤ n do
5:

P2: Execute_Refactorings(fi, S)

6:

P1: detected_defects = 0

7:

for all classk in S do

8:

P1, P2: (P1, b) = Threshold_Evaluation((P1, T_ r̂ , O_ r̂ ), (P2, classk))

9:

if b = 1 then

10:
11:

P1: detected_defects = detected _ defects + 1
end if

12:

end for

13:

P1: fitness_fi = |detected_defects|

14:

if fitness_ fˆ > fitness_fi then
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15:

P1: fitness _ fˆ = fitness_fi

16:

P1: fˆ = fi

17:

end if

18:

P1: fi+1 := Generate_New_Population(fi)

19:

P1 : i = i + 1

20: end while
21: return fˆ

4.7. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The total running cost depends on the number of candidate item sets , e.g. number
of detection rules and thresholds, number of refactorings, the rounds of GA and GP.
Suppose in detection step k original rules are generated from quality metrics and source
models contain l classes; each iteration will generate m new rules and the GP iteration
will terminate after n rounds, then time complexity is O(k*l+m*n*l). Similarly, in
correction step the time complexity depends on initial refactorings, the number of
generated new refactorings in each iteration and iteration rounds.
In this scheme, the running cost is highly related to comparison times because the
algorithm would encrypt data in each comparison round, which is the most timeconsuming action in the comparison process. In addition, SC protocol should be called
for each threshold of every individual rule, so the number of total execution rounds is
inevitable huge. Suppose each rule has r average thresholds, then SC would be executed
r*(k*l+m*n*l) times. The thesis will verify the performance of SC protocols and discuss
how to improve it in experimental results section.

4.8. COMPARISON TO TTP MODELS
Secure protocols are already implemented to preserve data and algorithm privacy
and they can replace TTPs to some extent. Now let us compare the two types of different
secure solutions and analyze what information is disclosed in the process. In the detection
and correction TTP models, P1 and P2 never interact except that finally P1 sends
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refactoring solutions to P2 . TTPs execute each individual rule, every refactoring
operation and compute fitness, so no private information would be revealed. However, in
secure protocols, they have to communicate to execute rules and compute fitness, then P1
or P2 may learn something in the communication rounds. For example, P1 would
generate a plenty of rules and a certain number of them may evaluate a same index, e.g.,
a rule contains ‘IF (NMD ≤ 100)’; another rule includes ‘IF (NMD ≥ 90)’, if both
comparison results are true, P1 would know the interval of NMD and even the exact
value in some cases.
Moreover, P2 will learn how to compute fitness while he calls the routine
Compares, which is the information disclosed in this protocol. By contrast, if P1 is
requested to calculate the fitness, it should know the total number of true defects which is
an input parameter of the fitness function. In short, some information has to be revealed
by the protocol Compares anyway.
However, compared to TTP models, the proposed secure protocols preserved
most private data and algorithm information even if there exist risks to leak minor part of
them. For example, in the routine Execute Rules, P1 ’s private quality metrics and
detection rules are kept secret; P2 ’s source models are never disclosed to P1 too. In
addition, Compare function keeps true defect information private and P1 cannot learn it.
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5. A SIMPLE EXAMPLE OF THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS

This section will introduce an example case here to review the secure defect
detection and correction process. In the process, rules R1, R2 and R3 are used to detect
source models. Take a piece of source models in appendix as example and suppose class
PrjInfos contains more than methods and the class is over 1500 lines, then it is a blob
based on rule R1. Similarly, suppose class GanttApplet contains spaghetti code and class
DeprecatedProjectExport- Data violates rule R3.
In detection step, P1 will generate initial rule set R1, R2, R3 and request P2 to
collect related information from source models for comparison. For instance, R1 requires
LOCCLASS and LOCMETHOD, then P2 should count the number of code lines in each
class and the number of code lines of each method in each class. To judge whether a class
violates R1, the only way is compare R1’s thresholds to collected information from P2 .
For security reason, the protocols apply secure 2-party computation technique for
comparison. Thus, no confidential information will be leaked and the two parties can still
learn what kinds of defects exist in each class. P1 and P2 will call Threshold Evaluation
routine to do the detection as following.

Threshold_Evaluation(( P1 , {1500, 129, 100}, {∧, ∨}), ( P2 , {1621, 145, 134}))

Then, P1 and P2 call Secure Comparison to compare each pair of integers.

Secure_Comparison(( P1 , 1500), ( P2 , 1621))
Secure_Comparison(( P1 , 129), ( P2 , 145))
Secure_Comparison(( P1 , 100), ( P2 , 134))

Next, P1 combines these results together with operators as below.

1621 ≥ 1500 ∧ 145 ≥ 129 ∨ 134 ≥ 100
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In this example, the output is true and then P1 determines that class PrjInfos is a blob for
secure comparison results judge that it violates the rule R1. This is just a round of an
individual rule to detect a single class. Finally, each rule should be applied to detect every
class and the total rounds will be up to 3 × n (e.g. n classes in source models). After
detection, P1 and P2 call Compares to compute fitness score of this rule set. Suppose P1
expresses its detection results with an integer set as below.

{ d i } ={{1, 0, 0}, {0, 1, 0}, {0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 1}}
{ ed i } = {E(1), E(0), E(0), E(0), E(1), E(0), E(0), E(0), E(0), E(0), E(0), E(0),
E(0), E(0), E(1)}

Each subset represents the defects of a class and the three integers in the subset denotes
three types of defects. The integer is either 1 if the class contains this type of defect or 0
otherwise. Then, P1 encrypts each integer and sends the sequence set { ed i } to P2 who
should also describe its example base with an integer set.

{ ei } = {{1, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0}, {1, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 1}}

Next, P2 calculates the product of each pair of ed i and ei , then sums them up together to
get the following result.

E(1) × E(1) = E(1 + 1) = E(2)

P1 receives E(2) from P2 and learns that the intersection is two after decryption. So the
fitness of this rule set will be

f = (2/3 + 2/3)/2 = 0.67
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Next, Genetic Programming process will perform crossover and mutation to generate new
offsprings (new rules), and P1 and P2 will apply these new rules to detect source models
again. For example, GP algorithm removed OR operation in R1, then a new rule R1’ will
be generated as below.

R1’ : IF (LOCCLASS ≥ 1500 ∧ LOCMETHOD ≥ 129) THEN defect = blob
Thus, for secure comparison algorithm, the input and output would be changed as the
following. T={1500, 129}, S={LOCCLASS, LOCMETHOD}, O={∧}, C={LOCCLASS
≥ 1500, LOCMETHOD ≥ 129} and R=C1 ∧ C2.
If the new rule’s fitness is better than previous ones, P1 will record the new rule
as current best solution. Finally, P1 will get best detection rule set which is suitable to
P2 ’s source models. In correction step, this rule set will be used to detect existing detects
after each correction.
For correction, initially P1 creates a n-dimensional refactoring solutions and sends
them to P2 for execution. In the above example, suppose the refactoring solutions are as
below.

MoveMethod(getWebLink, PrjInfos, DeprecatedProjectExportData),
MoveAttribute(WebLink, PrjInfos, DeprecatedProjectExportData),
PushDownMethod(actionPerformed, GanttApplet, DeprecatedProjectExportData)

In the process, a fitness function is used to quantify the quality of the proposed
refactorings, which checks to minimize the number of detected defects using the
detection rules generated in detection step.
Next, P1 will generate new refactoring solutions by Genetic Algorithm and
request P2 to execute them again. For instance, the mutation operator may change
PushDownMethod to Movethod and a new set of refactorings will be as the following.
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MoveMethod(getWebLink, PrjInfos, DeprecatedProjectExportData),
MoveAttribute(WebLink, PrjInfos, DeprecatedProjectExportData),
MoveRelation(GanttHTMLExport, getDescription, PrjInfos);

If the new solutions are better than all of others by fitness comparison, then P1 saves
them as current best solutions. At last, the process will select an optimal solution which
fixes most defects. Then, P2 can apply the solutions to correct defects in its source
models.
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6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

This section will discuss how to test the secure protocols. For Generic
Programming and Generic Algorithm in defect detection and correction, the work [13]
has already verified their precision and recall rates, so the thesis do not plan to provide
additional evaluations. This section will focus on the secure comparison protocol because
it is the most time-consuming part in the whole process.
First, it is very important to compute the running time of secure comparison for it
is important to know how it impacts the proposed approach. The cost of this algorithm
highly depends on the bit size of encryption and decryption keys. Usually the keys are
very large binary numbers, e.g. 512; 1024; 2048 bits, and people prefer to choose long bit
keys for it is hard to be cracked. However, long keys really make the algorithm much
inefficient and even unacceptable. The experiments show that for if two integers’
comparison in the range of [0 - 512], the cost is 0.18s for 1024 bit keys and over 1.25s for
2048 bit keys. Because the protocols have to do comparison for every detection rule, the
total running cost will be unbearable if long bit keys are used. In reality, it is safe enough
to use 1024 bit keys to encrypt private data. Then in the following experiments, only
1024 bit keys are applied to the detection and correction algorithms.
Kessentini tests his approach with some open-source programs: GanttProject
(Gantt for short) v1.10.2, Quick UML v2001, ArgoUML v0.19.8, and Xerces-J v2.7.0 as
the Table 6.1 shown. The performance of Kessentini’s approach is highly related to
Generatic Algorithm which is actually unchanged in this scheme, whose running cost
indeed depends on comparison times, the number of classes and rules. Thus, in the
experimental settings, the thesis will pay more attention on measuring its performance
under different size of source models rather than how many programs are used. Then the
research work decides to use GanttProject and Xerces to do it for they are medium-sized
programs and the results would clearly show the difference between two approaches. In
addition, some classes or some defects are removed from the program to verify the
performance of the secure approach in various scenarios.
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Table 6.1. Program Statistics
Systems

Number of Classes

KLOC

GanttProject v1.10.2

245

31

Xerces-J v2.7.0

991

240

ArgoUML v0.19.8

1230

1160

Quick UML v2001

142

19

As previously mentioned, three types of defects will be analyzed. In a word, blobs
are classes that do too much; spaghetti Code (SC) is code that does not use appropriate
structuring mechanisms; finally, functional decomposition (FD) is code that is structured
as a series of function calls. These represent different types of design risks. In the study,
the thesis uses a cross validation procedure and one open source project is evaluated by
using the remaining two systems as base of examples. For example, Xerces-J is analyzed
using some defects examples from Gantt. The complete lists of metrics, used to generate
rules, and applied refactorings can be found in [16].
Table 6.2 summarizes the testing results. In the experiments, SC represents the
approach with secure comparison, and SC & SI means that both secure comparison and
set intersection are applied to the approach. DET and COR are the abbreviations of
detection and correction, respectively. The experimental results are not exciting because
the proposed approach is much slower than the original one. The main reason is that the
protocols have to do too many secure comparisons in order to preserve both parties’
privacies. For example, the GanttProject program contains 245 classes and it is supposed
that every individual rule has three operators in average, because a rule set includes three
different rules to detect three types of defects, then the total number of comparison to
evaluate a rule set is 245 × 3 × 3 = 2205. It is mentioned that the average cost of running
secure comparison once is 0.18s, thus the detection algorithm will cost 2205 × 0.18 =
396.9s which is very close to the experimental result. However, you may observe that
there is no significant difference between the costs of SC and SC & SI, which is because
the set intersection algorithm only runs once for an entire rule set. In the first scenario of
GanttProjects, the execution rounds for SC and SC & SI are 2205 and 1, respectively, that
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is why SI didn’t cost too much time even if it still contains encryption and decryption
algorithms.
The table also shows that even if some classes are removed from GanttProject to
make it a small project, the running cost is still much higher than Kessentini’s approach.
To make it worse, the algorithm will cost similar time to do the detection even if all
defects are deleted from the program, which is because the protocols cannot reduce the
comparison times in detection step. For a larger program like Xerces-J, the detection
process will cost nearly twenty minutes and it will spend almost fifty minutes to fix
existing defects.

Table 6.2. Running Time Comparison(Seconds)
Systems Classes Blob SC FD

Original

SC

SC&SI

DET

COR

DET

COR

DET

COR

Gantt

245

10

14

9

7.76

16.87

350.46

704.21

359.07

801.57

Gantt

81

10

14

9

1.84

4.19

97.44

199.83

97.87

202.51

Gantt

81

0

0

0

1.64

0

96.26

0

96.74

0

Xerces

991

11

17 10 41.51 79.87 1219.21 2933.26 1321.04 3107.25

Another important issue is that the secure comparison and set intersection
algorithms are implemented with C language because the approach integrates a C/C++
package, GMP into the developed algorithms for large integer computation, but the
detection and correction algorithms are written with Java. Then, it will cost more time to
call C routines in a Java program. Next step, all codes will be rewritten with C language
and be integrated together, thus the algorithm will be much efficient than the current one.
Moreover, in the future’s work, it is possible to divide private data into different security
levels and only encrypt data in high levels, then the algorithms’ performance will be
significantly improved and its expected running time might be reduced to the same
magnitude as the original one.
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7. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

This paper analyzes privacy issues in design defect detection and correction and
then models TTP models in both defect detection and correction processes. In addition, it
designs new secure protocols to allow a third party to perform such detection and
corrections without leaking any private information. The main contribution is that the
thesis propose a practical approach to replace TTPs and make it possible for a Consultant
to offer detection and correction services while preserving both parties’ privacy.
Moreover, the secure comparison is a time-consuming part in detection process,
and the thesis analyzes its performance and compares running time of the approach with
that of the original one. Experimental results prove the effectiveness of this approach. In
the future, more defect detection and correction algorithms will be investigated and
design common secure protocols may be designed, which are suitable to most popular
detection and correction algorithms.
Finally, the proposed secure protocols may leak some private information
compared to ideal models. In the following work, more effective and efficient SDDC
protocols would be developed, which might be as secure as the ideal TTP models.
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APPENDIX

A SIMPLE EXAMPLE OF SOURCE MODELS
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Attribute(GanttCSVExport,prjInfos,PrjInfos,N,private);
Attribute(GanttProject,prjInfos,PrjInfos,N,public);
Attribute(GanttXFIGSaver,prjInfos,PrjInfos,N,private);
Attribute(PrjInfos,sDescription,String,N,public);
Attribute(PrjInfos,sOrganization,String,N,public);
Attribute(PrjInfos,sProjectName,String,N,public);
Attribute(PrjInfos,sWebLink,String,N,public);
Class(PrjInfos,N,N,public);
Method(NewProjectWizard,createNewProject,PrjInfos,
Y,N,N,public);
Method(PrjInfos,PrjInfos,N,N,N,N,public);
Method(PrjInfos,PrjInfos,N,Y,N,N,public);
Method(PrjInfos,getDescription,String,N,N,N,public);
Method(PrjInfos,getName,String,N,N,N,public);
Method(PrjInfos,getOrganization,String,N,N,N,public);
Method(PrjInfos,getWebLink,String,N,N,N,public);
Parameter(GanttCSVExport,GanttCSVExport,prjInfos,
PrjInfos,declaration);
Parameter(GanttHTMLExport,save,prjInfos,PrjInfos,declaration);
Parameter(GanttXFIGSaver,GanttXFIGSaver,prjInfos,
PrjInfos,declaration);
Parameter(PrjInfos,PrjInfos,sDescription,String,declaration);
Parameter(PrjInfos,PrjInfos,sOrganization,String,declaration);
Parameter(PrjInfos,PrjInfos,sProjectName,String,declaration);
Parameter(PrjInfos,PrjInfos,sWebLink,String,declaration);
Relation(GanttHTMLExport;save;getDescription,PrjInfos,N);
Relation(GanttHTMLExport;save;getName,PrjInfos,N);
Relation(GanttHTMLExport;save;getOrganization,PrjInfos,N);
Relation(GanttHTMLExport;save;getWebLink,PrjInfos,N);
Relation(GanttProject;getDescription;getDescription,PrjInfos,N);
Relation(GanttProject;getOrganization;getOrganization,PrjInfos,N);

41
Relation(GanttProject;getWebLink;getWebLink,PrjInfos,N);
Attribute(GanttApplet,button,JButton,N,private);
Attribute(GanttApplet,fileLocation,String,N,private);
Class(GanttApplet,N,N,public);
Generalisation(GanttApplet,JApplet);
Method(GanttApplet,GanttApplet,N,N,N,N,public);
Method(GanttApplet,actionPerformed,void,Y,N,N,public);
Method(GanttApplet,createContainer,Container,N,N,N,private);
Method(GanttApplet,init,void,N,N,N,public);
Method(GanttApplet,main,void,Y,N,static,public);
Parameter(GanttApplet,actionPerformed,e,ActionEvent,declaration);
Parameter(GanttApplet,actionPerformed,ganttFrameGanttProject,local);
Parameter(GanttApplet,actionPerformed,inSInputStream,local);
Parameter(GanttApplet,actionPerformed,urlURL,local);
Parameter(GanttApplet,createContainer,panelJPanel,local);
Parameter(GanttApplet,init,fileLocationParamString,local);
Parameter(GanttApplet,main,appletGanttApplet,local);
Parameter(GanttApplet,main,args,String[],declaration);
Parameter(GanttApplet,main,frameJFrame,local);
Relation(GanttApplet;actionPerformed;getCodeBase,Applet,N);
Relation(GanttApplet;actionPerformed;getInputStream,URLConnection,N);
Relation(GanttApplet;actionPerformed;openConnection,URL,N);
Relation(GanttApplet;actionPerformed;openXMLStream,
GanttProject,InputStream-String);
Relation(GanttApplet;actionPerformed;printStackTrace,Throwable,N);
Relation(GanttApplet;actionPerformed;setVisible,Window,boolean);
Relation(GanttApplet;actionPerformed;toString,URL,N);
Relation(GanttApplet;createContainer;add,Container,Component);
Relation(GanttApplet;createContainer;addActionListener,
AbstractButton,ActionListener);
Relation(GanttApplet;init;createContainer,GanttApplet,N);
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Relation(GanttApplet;init;getParameter,Applet,String);
Relation(GanttApplet;init;setContentPane,JApplet,Container);
Relation(GanttApplet;main;createContainer,GanttApplet,N);
Relation(GanttApplet;main;pack,Window,N);
Relation(GanttApplet;main;setContentPane,JFrame,Container);
Relation(GanttApplet;main;setDefaultCloseOperation,JFrame,int);
Relation(GanttApplet;main;setVisible,Window,boolean);
Attribute(DeprecatedProjectExportData,myExportOptions,
GanttExportSettings,N,package);
Attribute(DeprecatedProjectExportData,myFilename,String,N,package);
Attribute(DeprecatedProjectExportData,myGanttChart,
GanttGraphicArea,N,package);
Attribute(DeprecatedProjectExportData,myProject,GanttProject,N,package);
Attribute(DeprecatedProjectExportData,myResourceChart,
ResourceLoadGraphicArea,N,package);
Attribute(DeprecatedProjectExportData,myTree,GanttTree,N,package);
Attribute(DeprecatedProjectExportData,myXslFoScript,String,N,package);
Class(DeprecatedProjectExportData,N,N,public);
Method(DeprecatedProjectExportData,DeprecatedProjectExportData,
N,Y,N,N,public);
Parameter(DeprecatedProjectExportData,DeprecatedProjectExportData,
myExportOptions,GanttExportSettings,declaration);
Parameter(DeprecatedProjectExportData,DeprecatedProjectExportData,
myFilename,String,declaration);
Parameter(DeprecatedProjectExportData,DeprecatedProjectExportData,
myGanttChart,GanttGraphicArea,declaration);
Parameter(DeprecatedProjectExportData,DeprecatedProjectExportData,
myProject,GanttProject,declaration);
Parameter(DeprecatedProjectExportData,DeprecatedProjectExportData,
myResourceChart,ResourceLoadGraphicArea,declaration);
Parameter(DeprecatedProjectExportData,DeprecatedProjectExportData,
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myTree,GanttTree,declaration);
Parameter(DeprecatedProjectExportData,DeprecatedProjectExportData,
myXslFoScript,String,declaration);
Parameter(GanttProject,doExport,exportDataDeprecatedProjectExportData,
local);
Parameter(PDFExportProcessor,doExport,exportData,
DeprecatedProjectExportData,declaration);
Parameter(ProjectExportProcessor,doExport,exportData,
DeprecatedProjectExportData,declaration);
Relation(GanttProject;doExport;doExport,ProjectExportProcessor,
DeprecatedProjectExportData);
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